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Abstract 
 
There is nothing that we could be more familiar with than our own consciousness. It seems to us that 
conscious experience consists of subjective qualia – the what-it-is-like to experience the redness of an 
apple, the taste of coffee, or any other sense datum. Explaining how these can come about from material 
causes is often referred to as the hard problem in consciousness. Daniel Dennett gives a materialistic 
explanation of consciousness by equating qualia to a magic trick; there are no qualia, there just seem to 
be. In this paper I will examine this explanation in light of Heidegger's critique of technological thinking. 
Consciousness enframed in this way stands as a one-sided explanation that covers over more than it 
reveals. It is still useful, however, to see that it is the very building blocks of our conscious experience – 
our qualia – that we challenge forth to give us this one-sided view of experience. Dennett's explanation of 
consciousness is correct, but it does not capture the truth of consciousness.  
 
 
 
We live in the information age. The Internet stands as the largest reserve of information 
in our history. There is not a question that can be asked that someone hasn’t dared to 
answer. Many answers are uncontested facts: red light has a 700 nm electromagnetic 
wavelength. Some answers are ever-changing, on the cutting edge of research – like 
those in modern neuroscience. Other answers are not agreed upon, like what the Self is. 
Whatever the question, there is an explanation to be had. Even consciousness has been 
explained. Our answers are rigorous and the vast majority are undeniably correct, but 
are we any closer to the truth today than Aristotle was over two thousand years ago? In 
Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett uncovers the behind-the-scene workings of 
our minds; the aim of this paper is to demonstrate that Dennett’s account is a 
technological enframent and, though it shows us something interesting and true, it 
covers over more than it reveals. To do this I will first give an outline of Dennett’s 
book, focusing on his method and the most shocking claims – that there is no self and 
that qualia (the sense datum we experience) cannot exist. I will then turn to Heidegger's 
“Question Concerning Technology” to explore the nature of the correct and the true in 
terms of technological enframent. Lastly, I will show how Dennett's explanation of 
consciousness is a technological enframent and, though it says something correct about 
consciousness, it leaves out some of the most interesting parts of consciousness and 
therefore cannot be the truth.  
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Consciousness is like a magic trick. The key to understanding the magic is to realize 
that what you think you saw was an illusion. “What isn’t there, there isn’t to explain,” 
is the premise of Dennett’s theory of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness 
is explaining how physical input causes our phenomenal experiences. For instance, I 
have my experience of red and I have the facts I know about physics and neuroscience. 
I know that a certain atomic structure will reflect the electromagnetic wave into my 
retina, a series of neurons will fire in my brain, and I will see red. The problem is that 
the atomic structure isn’t red – nor is the electromagnetic wave. And if you cut open my 
brain, you will not find the red in there, either. Despite this, there is undeniably the 
experience of red. Dennett acknowledges that there seems to be red – the magician 
pulls a rabbit out of his hat, or so it seems. Might we be mistaken about our own 
phenomenological interpretations of our conscious experience?  
 
Dennett coins the term “heterophenomenology” for a method of investigating subjects’ 
claims about their conscious experience. This method assumes subjective experiences 
are fallible accounts of people’s inner phenomenological experience. Everyone 
considers themselves to be an expert on consciousness; what could we be more familiar 
with than our own consciousness? But we’re wrong. The more you probe into what 
people think they know about consciousness, the more you find inconsistencies. In 
heterophenomenology, accounts people give are viewed as texts that must be 
interpreted if we want to build a logical account of consciousness. Dennett hopes to 
recover from these fallible accounts of subjective experience something consistent to 
explain consciousness. In Being and Time, Heidegger uses what I see as a similar tactic 
of hermeneutics, claiming that there is no way to step outside of one’s subjective 
interpretation. Our experience is interpretation wall to wall; this is not relativism, as 
there is some recovery. The only place to start is with our own interpretations. 
 
With the method of heterophenomenology, we can deconstruct consciousness. Let us 
start with the common assumption that consciousness happens all in one place. What I 
mean by this is that it seems as if when I am conscious of an event my experience of 
seeing and hearing happen at the same time, then, from some central location that I 
define as my Self, I interpret the event and make decisions about it. That is to say, all 
senses seem to flow into what Dennett calls the Cartesian Theater, and all decisions 
seem to stem from some central viewer I call me. From a modern neuroscience 
standpoint, this makes no sense. Our brains do not quite work the way that Descartes 
imagined it; the animal spirits do not swirl around the pineal glad, which is in turn 
remote-controlled by our souls (Descartes, 1989). In Descartes’ Error, Antonio 
Damasio paints a picture of several specialized areas of the brain communicating and 
modeling different aspects of our consciousness. No single one of them is in charge. 
This assumption of a central location of consciousness is not only under attack from 
neuroscience, but also philosophy. The Cartesian cogito-sum, I think-I am (Descartes, 
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1993), according to Heidegger, sets into the history of philosophy an illusionary 
subject-object split (Heidegger, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). 
 
The color phi experiment illustrates another problem with the Cartesian Theater. In this 
experiment, two dots are flashed on and off on a screen, giving the illusion that one dot 
is oscillating back and forth. If one dot is set to randomly change color, a subject will 
experience an oscillating dot that suddenly changes color at the midway point of the 
dot’s spectrum. Setting aside the possibility of a premonition of what color the dot will 
change to there seem to be two explanations of this phenomenon of conscious 
experience, assuming the Cartesian Theater. The first explanation is that our 
unconscious mind re-writes our memory of what we experienced. The second is that we 
hold the experience in our memory until we have all the facts, at which point we show 
ourselves the experience as a whole. There is no way to test which of these is 
happening, and in reality neither is a satisfactory explanation. Dennett proposes the 
multiple drafts theory: there is no “finish line” that all the senses cross at the same time. 
Consciousness is like an essay, which is constantly being re-written. Which account a 
subject gives of his conscious experience will depend on which draft is filed as true. 
 
Another assumption of consciousness that is difficult to explain is the Self. This Self 
would be the homunculus sitting at the control panel in the Cartesian Theater. My Self 
is what I identify as me, but does this concept end at my physical body? Or does it also 
include my house, my car, my likes, my desires? Where does the split occur between 
subject and object? Why not look at the Self as the story I tell myself? Who else could I 
be other than who I tell myself I am? Dennett uses the phrase “narrative fiction” to 
describe the Self. What is the self? Another magic trick; an illusion.  
 
I view Dennett’s theory of consciousness as a deconstruction: he has laid away the most 
central aspect of consciousness – the Self. From this new ground of consciousness 
without a Self, he explains what seem like qualia in terms of judgments. ‘Qualia’ is a 
term used in philosophy for the intrinsic properties of our sense datum – colors, tastes, 
textures, sounds, smells. He relates the issue of qualia to a tangled kite string, saying 
that sometimes it is more economical for us to buy a new kite string than it is to 
untangle the old string. However, we cannot escape our interpretation, so we must pull 
at the threads until we can see that it is truly unredeemable. Dennett has done this in his 
article “Quining Qualia.” He ascribes four qualities to qualia: they are ineffable, 
private, intrinsic, and immediately accessible to perception. I agree that qualia must 
have these four properties, and nothing with these four properties could exist.   
 
Frequently, qualia are used as the quintessential definition of ineffable. How can I 
describe to you what my inner, subjective experience of red is like? I can easily 
describe an object that is red, but for all I know, the way red looks to you could be 
drastically different from the way it looks to me. The inverted qualia thought 
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experiment addresses this very concern by asking you to imagine someone who sees an 
inverted color spectrum. There would be no way to tell whether or not this was the 
case; even though yellow looked different to us, we would have both learned that the 
sun was yellow, and even though his yellow might be what I would call red, we would 
both call this qualia yellow. Dennett gives a counter thought experiment, where a mad 
neuroscientist inverts someone’s qualia while they sleep. He could do this in one of two 
ways: he could invert the actual qualia, or he could invert the memory of all previous 
qualia – and there would be no way to tell which one he had done. Even if he hadn’t 
changed the actual qualia, it would seem like he had. 
 
Hand-in-hand with qualia being ineffable, the phenomena that we are describing here 
are also intimately private. I cannot share with you my private qualia of red. In 
“Quining Qualia,” Dennett responds to the notion of qualia being private with 
Wittgenstein’s concept of a private language. By private language, Wittgenstein does 
not mean one that could be translated. The concept of qualia fits perfectly with what the 
private content of this language would have to be. We are given a picture of what a 
private language would look like in §258 of Philosophical Investigations, where 
Wittgenstein describes having a sensation that is impossible for him to define. Every 
time he feels this sensation, he writes “S” on a calendar. He cannot say what it feels 
like, just points to it in his minds eye when he feels it. Later, when he feels the 
sensation again, how does he know it is the same sensation? Could he be mistaken? The 
point of this example is that it does seem to depict a private language, but really every 
part of it has been communicated in a common language. If we were to question 
someone having such an indescribable sensation, we would probably get to the bottom 
of what the sensation sounded like, maybe, “Oh that’s just gas!” Wittgenstein writes, 
“So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands” 
(§261). Our example of what looked like a private language turns out to be no such 
thing, and the notion of calling qualia private runs into insurmountable problems of 
communication. In §253 Wittgenstein talks about criteria of identity: what is it that 
allows us to talk about our sensations? If our sensations were not alike to each other, 
there would be no understanding one another when we talked about them. If I truly had 
a private, ineffable qualia that corresponded to what I call red, there would be no 
communicating that I was experiencing red, yet I have quite plainly communicated just 
that.  
 
Some philosophers agree that qualia must not be private and ineffable, and that the 
qualia of red that I talk about must be like the qualia of red that you talk about (Tye, 
2009). But still, these qualia are irreducible to physical causes. There is some intrinsic 
phenomenal property of red that we undeniably see when looking upon a red object. It 
is interesting that these properties have to be intrinsic. We cannot talk about intrinsic 
properties without also discussing extrinsic properties. The intrinsic properties are the 
necessary properties; extrinsic properties are incidental. For example, let us discuss 
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what it is to be a chair. An intrinsic quality is the quality of being a place to sit; an 
extrinsic quality could be the material and design of the chair. The intrinsic quality of 
red, on the other hand, would be the experienceable qualia red I see, whereas an 
extrinsic quality of red would be the red things I see in the world. Dennett draws our 
attention to how there is no true, hard and fast line between intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties. For example, we say the redness of the chair is incidental, but the molecular 
makeup of its fabric –which causes the redness – is not. We say where it came from is 
an extrinsic property, unessential to its “chairness”, but the chair is dependent upon 
where it was made. 
 
If the intrinsic properties of qualia are taken to be the defining aspect of qualia, how do 
we explain the taste of beer, coffee, or wine – or any other acquired taste? It is true that 
I believe red looks the same to me today as it did ten years ago, but the hoppy flavor of 
beer brings a much different experience to me than it did when I had my first sip. Do 
we want to say that the intrinsic nature of qualia can change? Or might it be more 
understandable that the qualia are just as dependent on time and other factors as is 
anything that we might call an extrinsic property? And so, as Dennett says, “Properties 
that ‘seem intrinsic’ at first often turn out on more careful analysis to be relational” 
(Dennett, 1988). 
 
The last property frequently ascribed to qualia is that of being immediately 
apprehensible and undeniable. This is the property that seems most obvious to me. 
When is see the red chair, I take no time deliberating on its redness. In fact, when I see 
something I don’t immediately recognize and later decide it was an abstract chair, I 
spend no time deliberating on the colors it is make up of. Taking the empirical stance of 
Locke, qualia are to me the simple ideas through which we take in all information about 
the world (Locke, 1959). We could compare our qualia to pixels in a photograph: when 
I look at a scene, it is by distinguishing various shades of colors that I am able to make 
out shapes and forms of the objects in the scene, just as by various shades of colors and 
pixels a printer can produce a picture of any viewable scene. It seems that only through 
introspection can I get to the simple ideas that make up my more complex ideas. In 
everyday usage, I say that I see a chair – not that I see various shades of red, then judge 
it to be a chair. No, I instantly judge it to be a chair. Because of these quick judgments I 
make about objects, I am able to process immense amounts of data in my everyday life. 
I go somewhere new, look around, and make judgments on a large scale of what I see. I 
do not, pixel by pixel, qualia by qualia, present the world to myself. 
 
The world shows itself to me in countless judgments that I build up into complex ideas 
before I even know I’ve made a judgment. In simplest terms, this is Dennett's 
explanation: there is no hard problem of consciousness, no central self, only countless 
judgments; these judgments seem like qualia, they seem like a self, and this seeming is 
the magic trick of consciousness. “Qualia-philes” are people that can't let go of the 
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magic; they don’t want the trick to be explained. Personally, I find that judgments can 
account for and correspond to the way I experience consciousness; I can see through 
the magic. But the qualia-lover wants to say, “You haven’t really explained anything, 
you’ve at best explained consciousness away!” But I think this does give a good 
explanation of consciousness; it doesn’t explain it away, it explains it from one view: 
the materialistic reductionist view. It doesn’t explain what it seems like to be conscious, 
but it explains the material causes of consciousness.    
 
An explanation from one view point can be correct, but it cannot be the truth. The 
physical description of red is not going to be of much practical use to the artist. For 
Heidegger, there are two modes of unconcealment: challenging forth and bringing 
forth. Challenging forth is the enframent of judging a thing to be a this and not a that. 
Bringing forth, on the other hand, is a letting. The flower brings itself forth when it 
blooms. Heidegger says, 
 
Bringing-forth propriates only insofar as something concealed comes into 
unconcealment. This coming rests and moves freely within what we call 
revealing. The Greeks have a word alētheia for revealing. The Romans translate 
this with veritas. We say ‘truth’ and usually understand it as the correctness of 
representation (1993c, p. 318).  
 
When an idea shows itself, we say it is true if we believe it to correspond to the world, 
but there can never be a full disclosure; I cannot view an object from all sides at once. 
Viewing the front of the chair covers over the back. The same goes for ideas. I cannot 
mathematically describe light in a way that blinds me, as looking directly into the sun 
does. And even if we described everything we know about the sun, and we did it 
mathematically, scientific, then artistically, and mythologically, we could not hold all 
that shows itself in our minds at one time and we would still fall short of capturing all 
that is the sun. We can only capture one side at a time, and in our modern time we will 
challenge forth that side to be a description – an enframent – that can be called upon 
when desired. 
 
The concept of enframing shows itself in Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning 
Technology” as a challenging forth out of concealment. What is revealed comes forth 
out of concealment; it becomes unconcealed. When I judge the Rhein to be a source of 
power for a hydroelectric power plant, I am challenging it forth out of unconcealment 
and creating a standing reserve of power. Challenging forth is a mode of 
unconcealment that creates a standing reserve. This is not true for a windmill – it must 
wait for the wind, and does not unlock and store the wind’s energy. 
 
The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of 
setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. Such challenging happens in 
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that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is 
transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, 
distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew. Unlocking, 
transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing. 
But the revealing never simply comes to an end. (Heidegger, 1993c, p. 321-322) 
 
Wikipedia is a standing reserve of knowledge. The information we can find there has 
been gathered by demanding that it show itself. For example, the electromagnetic wave 
is information gathered from challenging our environment with exact mathematical 
calculation, and then written down to stand in reserve until someone wants to know 
what light is. We typically say something is true if it corresponds to reality, but here we 
are viewing truth as what is shown. Correspondence is limited in describing reality 
because reality cannot be captured from all sides at once. One cannot come up with an 
exhaustive list of all the potential uses for a river – one could challenge it forth to do 
almost anything with enough ingenuity. The typical understanding of truth thus fails to 
correspond to the everyday experience of reality. 
 
In trying to make a reductionistic explanation of the judgments and observations that I 
make in life, I come across this strange concept of qualia. Qualia are then given this 
status of being an insurmountable obstacle to explaining consciousness in materialistic 
terms. Galen Strawson writes, "assuming that materialism is true, the existence of 
conscious experience is the greatest unsolved problem of physics” (1992, p. 1). 
Strawson goes on to criticize Dennett by writing, “He is then left with the phenomenon 
of there seeming-to-be-phenomenology, and it is now this phenomenon that stands in 
need of explanation. . .” (1992, p. 4) This obstacle seems unnecessary to me: not only is 
the concept of qualia intangible, but also explaining my consciousness down into terms 
of simple judgment seems to be a more logical reductionistic claim. As I said earlier, 
my experience of a scene is processed quickly because I judge the objects in the scene 
to be this or that. When I reflect deeply on how it is that I take in this information and I 
come to the very sense datum that must make up the smallest reducible building blocks 
on my conscious experience, I can once again say that I quickly interpret this data by 
making a judgment: that is red. These judgments are more numerable than words in any 
language. We do not have specific words for the multitude of ways that tomato soup 
can end up tasting bad. Nonetheless, if I reflect on what it is that makes this tomato 
soup taste bad, I can come across the judgment that it is burnt, or too salty, or to sweet. 
What it is like for the soup to taste this particular way is a quintessential idea of what a 
qualia must be. But what quicker way for me to make a judgment, than for every 
judgment to correspond with what it is like to have that judgment? And, with that, I feel 
that Dennett has reduced consciousness into materialistic explanations.  
 
But an explanation of a chair is not a chair. An explanation of consciousness, in the 
same way, does not capture consciousness. In fact, explaining consciousness covers 
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over the very thing that makes consciousness so special: conscious experience. When I 
give to you an explanation of a chair, you cannot sit in it. Likewise, if I was an expert 
on bats, I could probably give you an incredibly detailed explanation of what it is like 
to be a bat. But no matter how you challenge forth an explanation of bat consciousness, 
you will never have the conscious experience of being a bat (Nagel, 1982). It would be 
impossible to step out of your own interpretation of the explanation of being a bat, and 
your own history of not being a bat. 
 
In conclusion, though we might be able to give a whole account of consciousness 
reduced to materialistic explanations, this does not present us with the truth. Dennett’s 
theory of consciousness is a challenged-forth, one-sided explanation, where the qualia 
magic trick of consciousness has been transformed into a standing account to be ready-
at-hand. Thus, it is consciousness enframed; it gives an account that I believe is correct, 
but in doing so it has nothing to say about what it is like to be conscious. There is a 
world of difference between explaining why the trick seems to be magic and 
experiencing the magic. Our explanation is correct but the truth of the matter is 
consciousness, and as Heidegger says, “The correct always fixes upon something 
pertinent in whatever is under consideration [but] . . . the merely correct is not yet the 
true” (1993c, p. 313). 
 
 
 
*This paper received a Utah Humanities Council Undergraduate Student Fellowship. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ Error:  Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. 
New York: Putnam. 
 
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown And Co. 
 
–––––. (1988) “Quining Qualia.” In: Marcel, A. & Bisiach, E. (eds.) Consciousness in 
Modern Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Descartes, R., & Voss, S. (1989). The Passions of the Soul. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. 
Co. 
 
–––––., & Cress, D. A. (1993). Meditations on First Philosophy:  In which the 
Existence of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body are Demonstrated (3rd 
ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. 
Res Cogitans (2011) 2                                                                                                         Bessinger | 88 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
 
Heidegger, M., & Krell, D. F. (1993a). “The Question Concerning Technology.” Basic 
Writings:  from Being and Time (1927) to The task of Thinking (1964) (Rev. and 
expanded ed., pp. 307-341). San Francisco, Calif.: Harper San Francisco. 
 
–––––. (1993b). “Being and Time: Introduction.” Basic writings:  From Being and 
Time (1927) to The task of Thinking (1964) (Rev. and expanded ed., pp. 37-87). San 
Francisco, Calif.: Harper San Francisco. 
 
–––––. (1993c). “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics.” Basic Writings:  
From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964) (Rev. and expanded ed., 
pp. 267-305). San Francisco, Calif.: Harper San Francisco. 
 
Hofstadter, D. R., Dennett, D. C., & Nagel, T. (1982). “What It Is Like to Be a Bat.” 
The Mind's I:  Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul (pp. 391-402). Toronto: 
Bantam Books. 
 
Locke, J. (1959). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Dover 
Publications. 
 
Strawson, G. (1992). “The Self as Software.” University of Reading - Academia.edu. 
Retrieved January 31, 2011, from 
http://reading.academia.edu/GalenStrawson/Papers/389273/The_self_as_software_199
2_?ref=nf 
 
Tye, M. (2009). “Qualia.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Retrieved January 31, 2011, from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/qualia/ 
 
Wittgenstein, L., & Anscombe, G. E. (2001). Philosophical Investigations:  the German 
text, with a revised English translation. (3rd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
